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Background: Tamiflu (oseltamivir phosphate ester, OE) is a widely used antiviral active against influenza A virus. Its
active metabolite, oseltamivir carboxylate (OC), is chemically stable and secreted into wastewater treatment plants.
OC contamination of natural habitats of waterfowl might induce OC resistance in influenza viruses persistently
infecting waterfowl, and lead to transfer of OC-resistance from avian to human influenza. The aim of this study was
to evaluate whether such has occurred.
Methods: A genomics approach including phylogenetic analysis and probability calculations for homologous
recombination was applied on altogether 19,755 neuraminidase (N1 and N2) genes from virus sampled in humans
and birds, with and without resistance mutations.
Results: No evidence for transfer of OE resistance mutations from avian to human N genes was obtained, and
events suggesting recombination between human and avian influenza virus variants could not be traced in the
sequence material studied.
Conclusions: The results indicate that resistance in influenza viruses infecting humans is due to the selection
pressure posed by the global OE administration in humans rather than transfer from avian influenza A virus strains
carrying mutations induced by environmental exposure to OC.
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Tamiflu (oseltamivir phosphate ester, OE) is recom-
mended by the WHO as a first line defense during influ-
enza pandemic situations [1]. The active metabolite,
oseltamivir carboxylate (OC) is secreted via urine or
feces [2] and degraded only scarcely by wastewater treat-
ment plants, which might lead to contamination of
aquatic ecosystems hosting waterfowl [3]. Since influ-
enza virus infections are persistent in waterfowl it has
been postulated that presence of OC in the natural habi-
tats of such birds could induce OC resistance among the
influenza virus strains that colonize waterfowl [4,5]. This
apprehension has been supported by field studies de-
scribing OC resistance mutations in influenza A virus
isolated from wild birds [6], and experimentally by* Correspondence: peter.norberg@gu.se
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unless otherwise stated.demonstrating rapid development of OC-resistant virus
in influenza A virus-infected mallards that were kept in
artificial, OC-containing environments [7]. This has
raised concerns that OC-resistance mutations might be
transferred to influenza A viruses that circulate among
humans, thereby compromising the use of OE [8]. It is
therefore important to assess, firstly, the risks for trans-
fer of OC resistance mutations that emerge in avian in-
fluenza virus into influenza virus spreading in the
human population, and, secondly, the possible influence
of this phenomenon on treatment efficiency.
The influenza virus neuraminidase (N) is the molecu-
lar target for OE/OC and, hence, the viral N genes are
the major carriers of resistance mutations (Reviewed in
[9]). Although zoonotic transfer of avian influenza A
virus to man occurs, mostly involving H5N1, H7N7,
H7N2, H7N3, and H7N9 [10,11], this usually represents
a dead end because further man-to-man transfer is rare.l. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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OC resistant mutations generated in avian influenza vi-
ruses could be transferred to human viruses (here the
term “human influenza virus” denotes virus variants with
capacity to spread in the human population) with or with-
out involvement of swine or other animals [12] considered
as “mixing vessels” for new pandemic influenza virus.
The probability of future genetic resistance transfer from
avian influenza virus to viruses circulating in the human
population may be assessed by evaluating past interactions
and exchange of genetic material between these viruses.
Thus, if transfer of resistance mutations from avian influ-
enza virus to human influenza virus has occurred, this
would have resulted in avian influenza virus sequence im-
prints in the N gene, some of which should appear in pub-
lished human OC-resistant sequences. To check for this
possibility we analyzed a large number of N1 and N2 gene
sequences of human and avian influenza A viruses repre-
senting both OC-resistant and wild-type strains.
Methods
Avian and human influenza virus N1 and N2 genes
studied
The influenza virus N1 and N2 genes discussed below
were derived from specimens taken from humans (hu-
man sources) or from birds (avian sources). Altogether
10,351 N1 genes from human sources and 2,062 N1 genes
from avian sources were analyzed, of which 107 genes
from human sources and four genes from an avian sources
contained the OE resistance mutant H274Y (designations
of resistance mutations as recommended by Ferraris and
Lina [9]), considered to be of relevance for OE resistance
in human subjects [9]. In addition, altogether 7,342 N2 se-
quences of human (n = 5,866) or avian (n = 1,476) sources
were analyzed, of which six human sources and one avian
source genes contained the R292K mutation, considered
to be of relevance for OE resistance in human subjects.
The sequences analyzed were derived from strains col-
lected between year 1933 and 2012 (more than 90% later
than 2000), and sequence data were obtained from the
GISAID (Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza
Data) EpiFlu™ Database. The search parameters were as
follows for respective type A influenza virus: Host: Human
and Avian, Location: all, Full genome: yes, Required Seg-
ments: HA and NA. Detailed information about all strains
harboring any of the above mentioned resistance muta-
tions are listed in Additional file 1: Table S1, Additional
file 2: Table S2, Additional file 3: Table S3, Additional file
4: Table S4, Additional file 5: Table S5, Additional file 6:
Table S6.
Phylogenetic and recombination analysis
The un-rooted phylogenetic trees were constructed using
the dnadist and neighbor joining programs included in thephylip package [13], using default settings. The search for
homologous recombination was carried out by using the
phi-test [14], and the methods RDP, GENECONV, Boot-
scan, MaxChi, Chimaera, SiScan, 3Seq, and LARD in-
cluded in the RDP package [15].
Results
A phylogenetic analysis was performed based on all se-
quences from influenza virus N1 genes from human and
avian sources. Due to the large number of strains, the
dataset was divided into nine subsets prior to the ana-
lysis. The dendrogram shown in Figure 1 is based on a
randomly chosen sub-fraction consisting of 111 N1 se-
quences containing the H274Y resistance mutation to-
gether with sequences from 616 N1 genes of human
source and 1,009 N1 genes of avian source. As expected,
the sequences segregated into separate clusters, where
Cluster A represented seasonal influenza viruses circu-
lating before the A(H1N1)pdm09, Cluster C the pan-
demic A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza N1 sequences, and B
and D represented N1 sequences of viruses collected from
animals, mostly birds. Analysis of the other eight subsets
of sequences presented similar divergences into these
clusters. Hereafter, sequences clustering in A and C are re-
ferred to as human N1 sequences, whereas sequences
clustering in B and D are considered as avian sequences.
Cluster A contained 92, and cluster C contained 15, N1
sequences of human source with the H274Y OE resistance
mutation whereas only four N1 sequences containing this
mutation were detected in cluster D and none in cluster B
(avian sources). Among all 10,351 N1 genes sequences
from H1N1 strains collected from humans only two, one
American (Figure 1, designated H1 in Cluster B) and one
Siberian (H2 in Cluster D), appeared among the avian se-
quences in the phylogenetic tree. Four specimens from
domestic birds but none from wild birds contained typical
human N1 sequences, clustering with sequences from the
pandemic H1N1 (Cluster C). All N1 genes sequences with
the H274Y resistance mutation that were derived from
human specimens were found among the typical human
N1 sequences in Clusters A and C, clearly distinct from
the two avian N1 genes of Cluster D.
A corresponding analysis was performed for N2 se-
quences of human (n = 5,866) or avian (n = 1,476) sources.
The oseltamivir resistance mutation R292K was identified
in six N2 genes of human and in one of avian source. As
with N1, the complete dataset of N2 strains was divided
into subsets prior to phylogenetic analysis. The phylogen-
etic tree (Figure 2) includes all genes containing the
R292K resistance mutation (n = 7) together with a ran-
domly chosen sub-fraction (n = 1,247) of the sequences
from humans and all the N2 genes of avian origin. The se-
quences segregated in two clusters, one representing hu-
man (Cluster B) and one representing avian N2 sequences
Figure 1 (See legend on next page.)
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Figure 1 Phylogenetic analysis of 616 N1 genes derived from H1N1 virus collected from humans and 1,009 N1 genes from influenza
virus (irrespective of hemagglutinin identity) in avian samples. The sequences represent a randomly chosen subset of the total set of
altogether 12,413 N1 sequences analyzed. All 111 sequences containing the OE resistance mutation H274Y are included in the dendrogram. N1
sequences of virus collected from birds, are indicated by red vertical bars, and N1 sequences, derived from human samples, are indicated by blue
vertical bars. N1 sequences from bird samples that map in clusters of sequences from human samples are denoted by red arrows, whereas
sequences from human samples that map in clusters of sequences from avian samples are denoted by blue arrows. Details for these sequences
are given in the bottom right section of the figure. Sequences carrying an OE resistance mutation are indicated by black arrows and, when
clustered, also by a dark yellow box. Different clusters of sequences are designated A-D in block capitals.
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lar divergences into these two clusters. One N2 sequence
from a human source was found among the N2 sequences
from avian in cluster A (Figure 2), whereas altogether
17 N2 sequences from avian were found among the N2
sequences with human source (cluster B). In conclusion,
among the 5,866 N2 sequences from H3N2 viruses identi-
fied in human samples, only one contained an N2 gene
that grouped with the avian sequences, i.e. indicated an
avian origin. Thus, transfer of avian N1 or N2 genes (with
or without the H274Y or R292K resistance mutations) to
H1N1 and H3N2 viruses circulating in the human popula-
tion appear to be very rare.
In addition to H274Y or R292K, we also analyzed the
whole set of 12,413 N1 and 7,342 N2 sequences for the
presence of other resistance mutations (I117V, E119V,
D198N, I222V, N294S and I314V). In total, any of these
additional resistance mutations were identified in 137 N1
sequences (48 avian, 89 human) and 103 N2 sequences (31
avian, 72 human), but in none of these did we observe
signs of transfer of resistance between human and avian
strains by reassortment or recombination, as shown in
Additional file 7: Figure S1 and Additional file 8: Figure S2.
The recent demonstration of intra-segmental homolo-
gous recombination in influenza A virus [16] has raised
the question whether the OE resistance mutations could
have been transferred from avian N genes to human N
genes via intragenic recombination between human and
avian N genes. This would result in chimeric N genes in
H1N1 or H3N2 virus with avian as well as human se-
quence elements. We searched for homologous recom-
bination between avian and human N1 or N2 genes
using the phi-test and methods included in the RDP
package, i.e., the methods RDP, GENECONV, Bootscan,
MaxChi, Chimaera, SiScan, 3Seq, and LARD. The ana-
lysis was performed on all large datasets included in this
study. No sign of intra-segmental homologous recom-
bination between human and avian N1 or N2 genes was
observed by any of the applied methods (p = 0.937 ac-
cording to the phi test). To avoid inference of multiple
testing owing to the large number of similar strains
without resistance mutations, we also performed all tests
on smaller datasets in parallel. These datasets containedonly the consensus strains of all major clades (marked as
A to D in Figure 1A and B in Figure 2), and the strains
containing the resistance markers. Nor in these datasets
could we find any sign of intra-segmental homologous
recombination between human and avian N1 or N2
genes resulting in transfer of resistance mutations.
Discussion
The present study, based on analysis of more than
19,700 complete N1 and N2 sequences in specimens
from humans infected with H1N1 or H3N2 virus, shows
that transfer of avian N genes to human influenza virus
via re-assortment or intra-segmental homologous recom-
bination is a rare event, irrespective if the avian N genes
carry resistance mutations or not. A range of OE resist-
ance mutations in avian influenza virus have been re-
ported, depending on the geographical location of the bird
populations [6,17], but their frequency in influenza viruses
circulating in wild birds is overall low [17]. Interestingly,
the H274Y resistance mutation was the only one found by
Järhult and coworkers in mallards under experimental
conditions with environmental OC concentrations [7], in-
dicating that OC resistance patterns are similar in avian
and human influenza H1N1 viruses. However, the present
data indicate that the vast majority of H274Y and R292K
resistance mutations evolve in the human influenza N1
and N2 genes without involving re-assortment, the major
mechanism for exchange of genetic material between in-
fluenza viruses [18], with corresponding avian influenza
genes. The low propensity of re-assortment between avian
and human N1 viruses observed here is in line with the
data by Obenauer et al. [19]. The absence of evidence for
homologous recombination between human and avian in-
fluenza N1 and N2 genes is in line with previous results
that homologous recombination, frequently occurring in
DNA viruses [20], after all is a rare phenomenon in the
evolution of influenza and other negative strand viruses,
although a few exceptions have been described [21-25].
It cannot be excluded that transfer of resistance muta-
tions from avian influenza N genes ever occur, or that
resistance mutations may be transferred and then sup-
pressed below the detection limit due to reduced fitness.
However, whereas in case of chronic HIV or hepatitis B
Figure 2 (See legend on next page.)
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Figure 2 Phylogenetic analysis of N2 genes derived from 1,254 H3N2-positive samples taken from humans and N2 genes from
1,450 N2-positive (irrespective of hemagglutinin identity) avian samples. The sequences represent a randomly chosen subset of the total
set of altogether 7,342 N2 sequences analyzed. All seven sequences containing the OE resistance mutation R292K are included in the dendrogram.
N2 sequences derived from birds are indicated by red vertical bars, and N2 sequences from human samples are indicated by blue vertical bars. N2
sequences from bird samples that map in clusters of sequences from human samples are denoted by red arrows, whereas sequences from human
samples in clusters of sequences from avian samples are denoted by blue arrows. Details for these sequences are given in the bottom right section of
the figure. Sequences carrying an OE resistance mutation are indicated by black arrows. The two major clusters of sequences are indicated by block
capitals A and B.
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even after termination of antiviral treatment, this is un-
likely for influenza virus which does not cause chronic in-
fections in humans. Instead, OE antiviral treatment of
humans has proven sufficient to induce essentially all OE
resistance that has been detected in human influenza until
today by selection of mutations within N1 and N2 genes
in strains that circulate in humans. Accordingly, the threat
to human health from OE resistance emerging as result of
treatment of infected humans appears to be much greater
than the risk posed by transfer of OC resistance induced
in avian influenza virus. This conclusion is not surprising
considering the stronger selection pressure for enrichment
of resistance mutations in oseltamivir-treated patients
with serum OE concentrations of up to 500 μg/L [26],
compared with more moderate concentrations (up to
30 μg/L) that avian influenza viruses encounter in animals
close to sewage outlets from waste-water purification
plants or adjacent watercourses [4,27,28].
A limitation of the present study is that it includes only
avian and human sequences. Thus, we cannot conclude
anything about the potential transfer of N genes or resist-
ance mutations between birds and swine. Another limita-
tion is that we have not analyzed OE resistance mutations
in non-human influenza virus types such as H5N1, H6N1,
H9N2, or H7N2, obtained from humans or birds. Thus, we
have not assessed if humans have been infected with avian
strains of these types that carry OE resistance induced by
environmental exposure. However, these types are dead
ends because they cannot be transmitted further to other
humans, and the absence of avian clustering among the
17,693 N1 or N2 sequences of human source indicate that
transfer of OE resistance by this mechanism is not import-
ant. Furthermore, due to the large number of strains, no
bootstrapping was included in the phylogenetic analysis.
Bootstrapping (bootscan) was, however, included in the re-
combination analysis performed using the RDP program.
Finally, it is important to stress that pollution of large
amounts of oseltamivir or its active metabolic derivatives
either as a consequence of manufacture or shedding from
treated patients is unsatisfactory from another point of
view. The status of OE as a stable, biologically non-
degradable compound with the inherent capacity to be
enriched in sensitive habitats raises concerns that OE maycause future but as yet unforeseen damage to wildlife in
sensitive ecosystems [8].
Conclusions
Our results presented here demonstrate that transfer of
OE resistance mutations from avian to human N genes
is extremely rare. It is therefore unlikely that resistance
in influenza viruses infecting humans has been trans-
ferred from avian avian influenza A virus strains carrying
mutations induced by environmental exposure to OC.
Instead, resistance in influenza viruses infecting humans
is most likely due to the selection pressure posed by the
global OE administration in humans.
Consent
No patients or persons were included in this study, and
accordingly no consents were obtained.
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Additional file 1: Table S1. Information about N1 strains harboring the
H274Y, R292K resistance mutations.
Additional file 2: Table S2. Information about N2 strains harboring the
H274Y, R292K resistance mutations.
Additional file 3: Table S3. Information about Human N1 strains
harboring any of the I117V, E119V, D198N, I222V, N294S or I314V
resistance mutations.
Additional file 4: Table S4. Information about Avian N1 strains
harboring any of the I117V, E119V, D198N, I222V, N294S or I314V
resistance mutations.
Additional file 5: Table S5. Information about human N2 strains
harboring any of the I117V, E119V, D198N, I222V, N294S or I314V
resistance mutations.
Additional file 6: Table S6 Information about Avian N2 strains
harboring any of the I117V, E119V, D198N, I222V, N294S or I314V
resistance mutations. (XLS 15 kb)
Additional file 7: Figure S1. Phylogenetic network of the N1 gene
harboring strains with any of the resistance markers I117V, E119V, D198N,
I222V, N294S and I314V. Non-resistant reference strains were included for
comparison. Strains of Avian origin are highlighted in red and strains of
human origin are highlighted in blue. Resistant strains have the type of
resistance mutation as a prefix in the strain name. The network demonstrates
no signs of reassortment or homologous recombination between avian and
human strains.
Additional file 8: Figure S2. Phylogenetic network of the N2 gene
harboring strains with any of the resistance markers I117V, E119V, D198N,
I222V, N294S and I314V. Non-resistant reference strains were included for
comparison. Strains of Avian origin are highlighted in red and strains of
Norberg et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:162 Page 7 of 7human origin are highlighted in blue. Resistant strains have the type of
resistance mutation as a prefix in the strain name. The network demonstrates
no signs of reassortment between avian and human strains.
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